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ALBERTO SZEKELY,* ALBERT UTTON,** CARMEN
PEDRAZZINI,*** ROSS SHIPMAN,**** ULISES
CANCHOLA,***** WILLIAM J. WAGGONER******

Transboundary Hydrocarbon
Resources: The Puerto Vallarta
Draft Treaty
INTRODUCTION
In September of 1979, an international study team of experts in international law and geology met for the first time, under the auspices of the
School of Law and the Natural Resources Center of the University of
New Mexico, as well as of the Institute of Legal Research of the National
Autonomous University of Mexico. The purpose of this gathering was
to put together a research project on the international law applicable to
the utilization and conservation, between neighboring coastal States, of
submarine transboundary hydrocarbon resources.
As the leaders of the team had in the past carried out similar research,
notably regarding groundwater deposits, it was appropriate and desirable
to use that same experience for the new undertaking, especially as that
experience pertained to the way in which the results of the research effort
eventually would be published. This consisted in producing a document
of concrete practical value, namely, a model for a draft treaty. This draft
treaty could be useful to any potential pair of neighboring States which
may be interested in embarking on bilateral negotiations for the utilization
and conservation of natural resources located in geographical areas divided by their common land or maritime boundaries. That is, transboundary resources.
The team also decided to follow the working scheme that led to the
final output of the groundwater project, which translated after a three
year effort into the publication of the "Ixtapa Draft Agreement Relating
to the Use of Transboundary Groundwaters. "'
The Ixtapa Draft, the product of a similar interdisciplinary and inter*Ambassador and International Legal Consultant.
**Director, International Transboundary Resources Center, University of New Mexico.
***Consulting Geologist, Mexico, D.F.
****Retired Associate Vice President for Research at The University of Texas at Austin and
Consulting Geologist.
*****Lawyer, Mexico, D.F.
******Lawyer with Coppler and Aragon Law Firm, Santa Fe, NM.
1. Rodgers & Utton, Ixtapa DraftAgreementRelating to the Use of TransboundaryGroundwaters,
25 Nat. Res. J. 713 (1985).
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national group of experts in the field, led to the Groundwater Working
Group meeting at the Rockefeller Foundation's Bellagio Study and Conference Center in Lake Como, Italy in September of 1987, which then
revised the Ixtapa Draft and produced "Transboundary Groundwaters:
The Bellagio Draft Treaty. 2 For this event, the International Transboundary Resources Center of the University of New Mexico employed its
"Triangle Working Session" key concept, in which scholars, decisionmakers, and opinion makers are brought directly together to improve
communication and thus policy, using as a basis the research produced
by an interdisciplinary and international study team of experts. Thus, the
hydrocarbon project was designed to be put into effect within the framework of this type of working strategy.
The submarine transboundary hydrocarbon resources team worked intensely over a period of six years with the support of, first, the Lincoln
Institute of Land Policy and, afterwards and fundamentally, the William
and Flora Hewlett Foundation, thanks to whom the International Transboundary Resources Center was established in 1986, having precisely
this project as its first main research objective.
The team was not able to benefit from the same quantity and quality
of pre-existing literature, previous international practice, or advanced
international progressive development of codification efforts, as did the
groundwater team. However, it resorted to all the materials, information
and experiences available, mostly restricted to some recent instances in
the realm of international jurisprudence, starting with the 1969 North Sea
ContinentalShelf Cases3 at the International Court of Justice and various
precedents of international conventional law involving very general bilateral agreements. These did not contain enough detailed elements to
enable the identification of comprehensive guiding principles and criteria
directly pertinent to the coordination of activities regarding submarine
transboundary hydrocarbon resources. The groundwater team was able
to resort to state practice in the well developed international law of
international watercourses for purposes other than navigation. In the case
of the submarine hydrocarbon team, it was necessary and essential not
only to resort, by way of analogy, to the experience and State practice
deriving from other transboundary natural resources, especially water,
but also to evaluate the degree of consolidation in the theory of this
emerging branch of international law. That is, the international law of
transboundary resources. Such evaluation unavoidably led the team to
undertake substantive theoretical research of its own, which has contrib2. Hayton & Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 Nat. Res. J.
663 (1989).
3. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Denmark; F.R.G. v. Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J.
51 & 52 (Feb. 20, 1969); 8 I.L.M. 340.
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uted to greater understanding of the legal complexity of national legal
issues and the international legal principles to be observed by neighboring
entities for the utilization, management, and conservation of such wealth.
Notably, the research produced and gradually published by the team also
led to the identification of an ambitious inventory of transboundary resources. 4 In the end, the team benefited enormously from such an intensive
research exercise, as it was much better equipped to directly apply its
results to the concrete subject matter of its project, creating, in a codified
fashion, what may be the most complete listing of guiding legal principles
and criteria pertaining to transboundary resources, in general, and to
submarine hydrocarbon transboundary resources, in particular.
With the above research and theoretical tools already in hand, the team
persevered by embarking on a detailed analysis, which led to the publication of four research papers.'
Having reached this advanced stage, the team met in Puerto Vallarta,
Mexico, in February of 1988 and in 1989, to finally consider various
preliminary drafts produced by its members, all of them enriched by the
research individually and jointly undertaken over a decade of continuing
work. The end-product of the meeting is the Puerto Vallarta Draft Treaty
whose text is hereby introduced, with short comments by the authors.
These comments explain the reasons that led to their contents, although
it is hoped that the provisions themselves are as self-explanatory as possible. After publication, the team will once again convene a triangle
working session to improve the Model Draft, the results of which shall
also be published.
It is important to note that, from the beginning, the team was animated,
first and foremost, by the primary objective of producing a research
product specifically useful to Mexico and the United States, given that
significant potential submarine hydrocarbon reserves already have been
identified lying across their common maritime boundary, both in the
Pacific and in the Gulf of Mexico. The same objective was pursued by
the groundwater team, as it pertained to the extensive land boundary
between the two countries, and which produced both the Ixtapa and the
Bellagio Drafts. Such localized geographical pattern and interest is because the Mexico-U.S. border constitutes an extensive laboratory for the
4. Szekely, Transboundary Resources: A View from Mexico, 26 Nat. Res. J. 669 (1986). See
also, Transbondary Resources Law (A.E. Utton & L.A. Teclaff eds. 1987).
5. Pedrazzini & Tryssier, Hydrocarbon Deposits of the Border Region Between Mexico and the
United States: A Preliminary Report, 26 Nat. Res. J. 695 (1986); Shipman, Energy on the U.S.Mexico Border, 26 Nat. Res. J. 711 (1986); Utton & McHugh, On an InstitutionalArrangementfor
Developing Oil and Gas in the GulfofMexico, 26 Nat. Res. J. 717 (1986); Szekely, The International
Law of Submarine Transboundary Resources. Legal Limits to Behavior and Experiences in the Gulf
of Mexico, 26 Nat. Res. J. 733 (1986). See also, Szekely, Transboundary Oil and Gas Selected
Bibliography, 26 Nat. Res. J. 833, which later constituted the basis for, finally, proceeding to the
elaboration of the model draft treaty.
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international law of transboundary resources, from which precedents and
model experiences can be derived which also may be of value to other
neighboring States when dealing with their transboundary wealth. That
also explains why the International Transboundary Resources Center concentrates its attention precisely on the border between Mexico and the
United States, two countries with a rich history of successful cooperation
in the field.
Few states in the world community have more experience than Mexico
and the United States in dealing efficiently with resources at either side
of their border. The work of the International Boundary and Water Commission in many ways has been a model for other states in the field. The
wide variety of transboundary resources between Mexico and the United
States is extensive.' Among them, groundwater seems to be the resource
in the greatest need of attention, linked as it unavoidably is to the elementary needs of an expanding border population.' Although the constantly fluctuating nature of the world's energy situation makes it now
more risky to predict energy prices, present trends point to a continuing
demand for hydrocarbon resources, often found in the transboundary
region between two countries. 8 Irrespective of the role hydrocarbons will
play in the national economies of Mexico and the United States, and of
the impact they will eventually have on the satisfaction of their energy
needs, hydrocarbons will surely be very much on the agenda of bilateral
relations between the two countries. Until now, the abundance of the
resource on each side of the border, subject to the unquestionable sovereignty of each of the two countries, has made the issue primarily a
commercial one. But whenever either of them attempts to exploit a deposit
situated in an area crossed by their political boundary, the rights of the
other will be at stake. Sooner or later the affected country will seek to
protect those rights.
The exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in the sea
often has been the source of conflict, as the national boundaries interfered
with potentially productive areas. However, the development of appropriate legislation and especially of cooperation agreements between the
interested national parties has kept pace with these problems. Many countries, though, have not met such problems to date and their legislation
has not anticipated such issues.
An example is the case of transboundary deposits between Mexico and
the United States. Though cases of significant transboundary hydrocarbon
deposits are known in the land border region, there are no precedents of
6.
7.
Neb.
8.

Szekely, Transboundary Resources:A View from Mexico, 26 Nat. Res. J. 669 (1986).
Utton, InternationalGroundwater Management: The Case of the U.S.-Mexican Frontier, 57
L. Rev. 633 (1978).
See Y. Mohammad & W. Mead, World Oil Prices: Demand, Supply, and Substitutes (1990).
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coordinated exploitation. 9 However, future economic production should
be anticipated in the deep offshore margins of the Pacific and the Gulf
of Mexico.
Today's development of offshore hydrocarbon resources shows a continuing trend toward deeper waters. This trend is noticeable in many areas
of the world-the Sea of Norway and offshore Brazil, for instance-and
is most evident in the Gulf of Mexico where it is reflected in the first
place by the extension of U.S. leasing activity toward the central Gulf.
At the present time, 860 leases are active at water depths greater than
400 meters. A test well has been drilled at a water depth of 2,200 meters.
Production has also reached the upper continental slope: fields are being
developed in the southern gulf at water depths ranging from 400 to 600
meters. These new extensions are "frontier areas" both in an economic
and technological sense. The economnic factor depends not so much on
present prices as on market trends and middle term assessment of hydrocarbon demand due to long planning and development time of deep
offshore structures.'" The technological factor, driven by economics, is
flexible and presents continually new solutions to adapt to the changing
conditions.
Although hydrocarbon market prices have fluctuated dramatically, it is
predicted that the demand for this relatively cheap energy source will
eventually grow significantly."
By then pressure to develop transboundary energy reserves will also
increase and conflicts will be difficult to avoid. It is thus believed that
the development of hydrocarbon resources in the deep offshore border
zones requires the attention of specialists to provide an adequate legal
regime, in order to prevent future conflicts in maritime hydrocarbon
producing areas and to promote harmonious exploitation by both national
parties.
The purpose of offering a Model Draft of this nature is dictated chiefly
by the desire to foresee the alternatives available to neighboring States
before the question of how to deal with specific transboundary resources
in their common border becomes a critical political issue in their bilateral
relations. Whether it is fisheries, migrant workers, narcotics traffic, trade
restrictions, pollution or other difficult border affairs, neighboring countries often do not face the issues until they have reached the level of
crisis, or even exploded into full scale disputes.' 2 Solutions usually become even more difficult to attain, as they become burdened with in9. See Shipman, supra note 5.
10. Y. Mohammad & W. Mead, supra note 8, at 95.
11. Id.
12. For the case of Mexico-U.S. border problems, see generally, M. Ojeda, Alcances y Limites
de la Politica Exterior de Mexico (1976); Rules of the Game and Games without Rules in Border
Life (M. Miranda & J. Wilkie eds. 1983).
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transigence and exacerbated nationalistic attitudes. Thus, an attempt at
preventive diplomacy seems to be a much better approach. A Model Draft
like the one hereby proposed is thus consciously anticipatory in posture,
especially because it is designed as a master plan for specific resources
in general but not for a particular deposit.
One of the main virtues pursued by the Model Puerto Vallarta Draft
may be that it is site specific in that it develops a possible regime to be
ideally convened by two neighboring States with totally different legal
systems, especially in the field of natural resources. The legal regime of
Mexico, on the one hand, contemplates exclusive state participation in
the undertaking of all activities in all phases and stages regarding that
Nation's hydrocarbon resources while, on the other hand, the legal framework of the United States fundamentally allows private participation through
leasing policies and regulation of concessionaires. Because of those fundamental differences, the comments to each of the provisions of the Model
Draft deal at length with the relationship and applicability to the contrasting Mexico-United States legal regimes.
The Joint Permanent Coordinating Commission and the Bilateral Coordination Schemes are two concepts which deserve special introduction.
These two vehicles play key roles in the implementation of the guiding
principles and criteria for all activities regarding these resources. It was
in this aspect that the authors had to become more imaginative and inventive, transcending prevailing international practice pertaining to these
and other transboundary resources, albeit borrowing from that practice
as much as possible. Here, once again, Mexico-U.S. past experiences
were of great use to the team. It is thus hoped that this Model Draft will,
in turn, be equally of great use to those two countries as well as to other
neighboring coastal States.
MODEL PUERTO VALLARTA DRAFT TREATY ON GUIDING
PRINCIPLES AND CRITERIA FOR THE COORDINATION OF
ACTIVITIES REGARDING SUBMARINE TRANSBOUNDARY
HYDROCARBON RESOURCE LYING IN THE MARITIME
BOUNDARY BETWEEN NEIGHBORING COASTAL STATES
COMMENTS TO TITLE OF THE MODEL DRAFT
1. The Draft is proposed as a "Model" that could ideally be followed
by any set of neighboring coastal States. It has been elaborated so that
it can be easily adjusted to the political, geographical, geological, and
other realities peculiar to any kind of potential negotiating parties. However, as stated in the introduction, the provisions of the Draft were designed to be particularly useful in overcoming problems stemming from
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basic differences in the legal systems of the negotiating Parties, mostly
in the field of natural resources. When those differences do not exist, the
challenge for agreeing on a treaty of this nature would be considerably
diminished. For example, when one legal regime provides for private
initiative while the other legal system restricts access exclusively to State
participation, unusual difficulties are posed when dealing with a resource
whose special characteristics, location, and nature make it more advisable
to exploit and conserve in as unified a manner as possible, such as
transboundary submarine hydrocarbons.
2. Consequently, the Draft, as a model, remains at a level of sufficient
generality to allow for accommodation of realities and legal differences.
But it provides for a regime, as detailed as possible, with sufficient basic
elements which should be essential common denominators in treaties of
this type, independent of those realities and legal differences. Those basic
and common elements for a convened regime between neighboring coastal
states would be, on the one hand, an agreed list of guiding principles to
be observed by the parties whenever undertaking activities regarding those
resources and, on the other, specific criteria for the coordination of those
activities between the parties, with the corresponding detailed mechanisms for the implementation of those mutually agreed criteria.
3. In the case of Mexico and the United States, even if they intelligently
muster the political will to negotiate a regime for submarine transboundary
hydrocarbons, their difficulties will be considerable. They will be dealing
with a resource quite different from those with which they are more
familiar, such as international river water. Their legal systems for oil
exploitation are particularly at variance, and the role of natural resources
as part of their domestic and foreign policy is quite distinct, especially
when it comes to protecting them from foreigners. If these apparently
insurmountable problems are overcome, but primarily if the political will
exists, they will embark on a new venture. For this challenge it will be
necessary, on the one hand, to settle on the rules of the game as to the
limits for their behavior in order to respect their reciprocal rights and
duties and, on the other, to define the operational instruments, mechanisms, arrangements, and institutions through which they will jointly go
about rationally and equitably utilizing those resources, under a framework of international bilateral cooperation.
4. It is the aim of this Model to provide neighboring States, such as
Mexico and the United States, with a suggested legal framework based
both on previous experience in the field in different parts of the world,
as well as on new creative ideas (whenever such experiences have remained insufficient) to draw a standard of principles and criteria for
coordination of activities regarding submarine transboundary hydrocarbon
resources.
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PREAMBLE
and
hereinafter referred to as "the Parties,"
CONSCIOUS of the potential for the confirmed existence
of various deposits of submarine hydrocarbon resources
which are located in a transboundary fashion, in that they
extend across the common maritime boundary, as established through
(reference should be made here to the relevant treaty or
agreement in force, if any, of maritime delimitation).
COMMENTS TO FIRST PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH
1. The authors felt that the mere probable existence of transboundary
submarine hydrocarbons, as indicated by reasonable scientific information, is enough to justify triggering the negotiation of a treaty of this
nature between the neighboring coastal States involved. This preambular
paragraph is subsequently elaborated, on a normative basis, in paragraph
1 of article 3. The purpose of both provisions is to avoid, as much as
possible, either a competing race for the resource in a unilateral or disorderly fashion, or the possibility that one of those states could gain a
position of advantage over the other by not sharing basic information
with its neighbor.
2. In this preambular paragraph, it is also assumed that some kind of
submarine maritime delimitation has already been agreed to by the parties.
However, nothing would preclude the parties from using this precise type
of treaty to expressly agree on the delimitation of their submarine boundaries. This has been done in a number of bilateral treaties.
3. Approximately 14 of the 58 bilateral delimitation agreements examined by the authors, make no reference whatsoever to resources in the
delimitation area, but restrict themselves to providing directly for the
delimitation boundary agreed on. 3
13. See e.g., Treaty Relating to the Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria, Feb. 26, 1942, United
Kingdom-Venezuela, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.8/1, reprintedin, I The International Law of Ocean
Development 432 (S. Oda ed. 1972); Agreement Concerning the Boundaries of Sea Areas of the
Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Finland, May 20, 1965, Finland-U.S.S.R., 566 U.N.T.S. 31;
Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under the North Sea, Oct. 6, 1965,
United Kingdom-Netherlands, 595 U.N.T.S. 115 [hereinafter cited as Netherlands-U.K. Treaty];
Agreement Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea, Mar. 31,
1966, Netherlands-Denmark, 604 U.N.T.S. 214 [hereinafter Netherlands-Denmark Treaty]; Agreement Concerning the Boundary of the Continental Shelf Between Finland and the Soviet Union in
the North-Eastern Part of the Baltic Sea, May 5, 1967, Finland-U.S.S.R., 640 U.N.T.S. 111; Treaty
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4. The authors believe that it could be even more difficult for two
neighboring coastal states to simultaneously embark upon a negotiation
of both their common boundaries and the regime applicable to their
transboundary submarine hydrocarbons, unless they feel that the two are
inevitably intermingled. That would be the case of a delimitation negotiation whose results, as to the location, direction, and dimension of the
boundary is to be affected by the presence, location, and dimension of
already identified resource deposits.
5. The general formula adopted in this Draft would be more appropriate
for neighboring countries which, as was already said, had previously
agreed on the delimitation of their common submarine boundary. Such
was the case, for instance, of Mexico and the United States, who agreed
on their maritime boundaries through an exchange of Diplomatic Notes
on November 24, 1976.4 The two countries subsequently negotiated, in
order to formalize the 1976 Exchange Notes, a Treaty on Maritime Delimitation concluded in Mexico City on May 4, 1978, already ratified by
the Mexican Senate and pending advice and consent by the U.S. Senate.' 5
DESIROUS of ensuring that any activities related to those
resources be undertaken, on either side of the boundary,
on the Course of the Boundary of the Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Gdansk and the Southeastern
Baltic Sea, Aug. 28, 1969, Poland-U.S.S.R., reprinted in I The International Law of Ocean Development 409 (S. Oda ed. 1972) [hereinafter Poland-U.S.S.R. Treaty]; Agreements Delimiting the
Continental Shelf in the North Sea, Protocol, Jan. 28. 1971, Denmark-Federal Republic of GermanyNetherlands, 10 I.L.M. 600; Agreement Delimiting Maritime Boundaries in the North Atlantic Ocean,
June 4, 1975, Gambia-Senegal, reprinted in 8 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 104 (M.
Nordquist, S. Lay & K. Simmonds eds. 1980); Agreement on the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf
of Mannar and the Bay of Bengal and Related Matters, Mar. 23, 1976, Sri Lanka-India, reprinted
in 8 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 99 (M. Nordquist, S. Lay & K. Simmonds eds. 1980);
Agreement Concerning Certain Maritime Boundaries, Nov. 24, 1976, United States-Mexico, 19
U.S.T. 196, T.I.A.S. No. 8805 [hereinafter United States-Mexico Agreement]; Maritime Boundary
Agreement, Dec. 16, 1977, United States-Cuba reprinted in 8 New Directions in the Law of the
Sea (M. Nordquist, S. Lay & K. Simmonds eds. 1980) [hereinafter cited as United States-Cuba
Agreement]; Maritime Boundary Treaty, Mar. 28, 1978, United States-Venezuela, reprinted in 8
New Directions in the Law of the Sea (M. Nordquist, S. Lay & K. Simmonds eds. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as United States-Venezuela Treaty]; Treaty on the Delimitation of Marine and Submarine Areas,
Mar. 3, 1979, Dominican Republic-Venezuela, reprinted in 8 New Directions in the Law of the Sea
(M. Nordquist, S. Lay & K. Simmonds eds. 1980).
14. See Mexico: Relaci6n de Tratados en Vigor. Junio-1987, p. 31; Tratados Ratificados y Convenios Ejecutivos Celebrados por Mexico. Tomo XXI, pp. 963-965; Treaties in Force: A List of
Treaties and other International Agreements of the United States in Force on January 1, 1987, 123.
15. See Szekely, BasesJuridicaspara Nuestra Soberaniasobre los Hidrocarburosdel Golfo de
Mexico, 6-7 La Gaceta de Tlatelolco 7-15 (1978); Szekely, A Comment with the Mexican View on
the Problem of Maritime Boundaries in U.S.-Mexican Relations, 22 Nat. Res. J. 155 (1982); see
also, Marion, U.S. MaritimeBoundaries with Mexico, Cuba and Venezuela, 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 161
(198 1); Hedbergh, Evaluation of U.S.lMexico Draft Treaty on Boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico, 14
Marine Tech. Soc'y J. 32 (1980); Schmitt, The Problem of Maritime Boundaries in U.S.-Mexican
Relations, 22 Nat. Res. J. (1982). On the effect of submarine hydrocarbons in the delimitationon
maritime boundaries, see Ruiz Moreno, Las Explotaciones Petrolferas en las FronterasInternacionales, in Anuario Hispano-Uso-Americano de Derecho Internacional 92-98 (1959).
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strictly within the spirit of cooperation which characterizes
their mutual friendly relations, and in conformance with
the spirit of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 34/99 of November 14, 1979, on the Development
and Strengthening of Good Neighbourliness Between States.
COMMENTS TO SECOND PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH
1. This U.N. General Assembly Resolution, but most importantly the
work undertaken on the basis of its provisions by its Sixth Committee
on the Development and Strengthening of Good Neighbourliness Between
States, has become a cornerstone instrument that provides a "soft-law"
source for the emerging international law of transboundary resources.
The Resolution is particularly relevant because it calls on neighboring
states to deal with each other within a framework of certain standards of
mutual confidence and cooperation, so as to avoid conflicts and ensure
friendship and good neighborliness when dealing in good faith with their
transboundary resources.
2. The concept, which is to be eventually developed through a "proper
international document," is based on the general principle of cooperation
in the border zone, on the basis of equality of right, equity, and mutual
benefit in the exploitation of "common resources." Subsequent documents go further to call on neighboring states to cooperate on maritime
problems, such as the delimitation of maritime zones where common
exploration and exploitation of common resources, which constitute a
physical unity, will prove to be more advantageous than individual exploitation.
CONVINCED that the above common objective can only
be attained in strict compliance with the principles of international law applicable to these types of transboundary
resources, and within the framework of commonly agreed
criteria and mechanisms;
COMMENT TO THIRD PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH
See comments to the Title of the Model Draft, as well as to articles
2, 3, 4 and 5.
BEARING IN MIND the need to mutually respect the inalienable right of permanent sovereignty over the part of
those natural resources which belong to each of the Parties
and their peoples on each respective side of the common
maritime boundary, as recognized by United Nations As-
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sembly Resolution 1803/XVH of December 14, 1962, which
establishes the right of each country to freely dispose of its
natural resources in accordance with its national interest
and in conformity with the rules and conditions which its
people freely consider to be necessary or desirable;
COMMENTS TO FOURTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH
1. This Resolution is elementary for the understanding of potential
conflicts which may arise from the very nature and location of transboundary resources, as it is expected that each neighboring state, on each
side of the common boundary, will claim an inalienable right of permanent
sovereignty over the part of those resources on its own side of that
boundary. Also included is the right of each neighboring state to freely
dispose of that part of the resource that belongs to it, independently of
whether or not those resources are migratory because of their liquid, fluid,
or gaseous nature.
2. Once a state is assured that it will be able to secure a fair share of
a transboundary resource, it will be more inclined to negotiate and cooperate with its neighbor for the adequate exploitation and conservation
of that natural wealth, as unavoidably required by its physical unity.
3. Consequently, specific references in this preambular paragraph to
the fundamental provisions of this historic General Assembly Resolution
constitute a legal safeguard of the essential rights of the parties, in the
light of which the rest of the Treaty is to be applied and interpreted. This
would be of special interest to those states whose national policies or
legislation are less prone to be flexible in regard to the concept of sovereignty over natural resources, even if willing to respect the physical
unity inherent in transboundary resources.
4. The International Law Commission (ILC) has been working on a
draft article dealing with international water courses as "shared natural
resources," in order to rule their non-navigational uses. The work of the
ILC has been the subject of deliberation by States at the Sixth Committee
of the General Assembly, where the concept of a "system of an international watercourse" has been developing.
5. The draft articles so far produced by the ILC are designed to provide
for the management and conservation of such systems, on the basis of
the principle that there is a duty to utilize them equitably and reasonably,
and that unilateral activities are prohibited if they cause applicable harm
to the other States in the system.' 6
16. See U.N. International Law Commissiori, FirstReport on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of InternationalWatercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/367 (1983); U.N. International Law Commission, Fifth Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of InternationalWatercourses, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/21 (1989).
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RECALLING Principle 21 of the Declaration adopted in
Stockholm by United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, on June 16, 1972, which recognizes that States
have, in accordance with the charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;
COMMENTS TO FIFTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH
1. Once the inalienable right of a state's permanent sovereignty over
its natural resources was established by the General Assembly of the
United Nations, through its resolution 1803/XVII, that right was reaffirmed a decade later, albeit the concept of sovereignty was restricted,
so that it would not be exercised in an absolute fashion, thus imposing
a limitation on state behavior even when dealing with its own natural
wealth, through Principle 21 of the Declaration of Stockholm.
2. This Declaration has to be viewed as one of the fundamental instruments which constitute the basis of the international legal regime
applicable to transboundary resources. General Assembly Resolution 1803
and Principle 21 constitute a whole. Resolution 1803, by itself and without
the limitations imposed by Principle 21, would allow a State to act, in
the exercise of its right of sovereignty, within the framework of an absolute
concept, managing its natural resources unrestricted and with complete
disregard for the rights of other States. In the case of transboundary
resources, such a situation would obviously lead to their inadequate management, to the violation of the rights of the neighboring State, and more
importantly, to resource waste, ecological deterioration, and, above all,
to international conflict.
3. Resolution 1803 and Principle 21 constitute two central and interlocking pieces that provide a doctrinal basis for the international law of
transboundary resources. The provisions of both instruments have been
subsequently developed in a progressive fashion through other significant
international instruments, this time applying those provisions directly to
natural resources located in a transboundary fashion. The 1973 Declaration approved by the Fourth Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries
served as the immediate precedent for the first General Assembly Resolution concretely adopted on the subject. This was the Resolution on
"Co-operation in the Field of the Environment concerning Natural Re-
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sources Shared by Two or More States,"' 7 which set the foundations for
the principles to be observed by neighboring states to cooperate in the
said field. This Resolution was followed by others that contributed to the
development of those principles which, as it was said, find their origin
in Resolution 1803 and in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration.'"
4. It was on the basis of the above international instruments, all of
them stemming from the safeguard of sovereignty established in Resolution 1803, as well as the protective safeguard for the neighboring State
provided by Principle 21, and on the basis of other pertinent international
practice, especially treaty practice, that the authors of this proposed Model
designed the list of Guiding Principles and Criteria which appear in
Articles 2 and 3 of this draft treaty.
MINDFUL also of their obligations under multilateral conventions and related instruments relating to the prevention
of pollution of the sea by oil to which they are Parties, as
well as their obligations under the bilateral agreements they
have concluded on the matter, namely,
(Reference should be made here to the relevant bilateral
treaty of agreements in force, if any.)
COMMENTS TO SIXTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH
1. Obviously any potential treaty of this kind must be framed within
the bounds of the international law, especially the conventionally created
law that has been adopted both at the multilateral and bilateral levels to
protect the marine environment from sources of pollution. Certainly submarine hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation constitute activities prone
to adversely affect, even when all preventive measures are taken, the
quality of the ocean environment, its resources, and its ecological balance
in general.
2. The norms of the international law regarding the prevention of
marine pollution have been codified in numerous multilateral conventions.
17. Co-operation in the Field of the Environment Concerning Natural Resources Shared by Two
or More States, G.A. Res. 3129, 28 U.N. GAOR (2199th plen. mtg.) at 57, U.N. Doc. 2/A/9330
(1973); 13 I.L.M. 232.
18. The General Assembly adopted progressively its Resolutions on the matter. It is of special
significance to note that on May 19, 1978, the U.N. Environmental Program Intergovernmental
Group of Experts adopted, in Nairobi, the DraftPrinciplesof Conduct in the Field of the Environment
for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources
Sharedby Two or More States, 6 U.N. Environment Programme at U.N. Doc. GC.6/CRP.2 (1978);
17 I.L.M. 1096.
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3. Illustrative of the treaties and international deliberations which would
be considered are the pertinent provisions of the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, 9 the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea,2° the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea,2' the 1954 London International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution of the Sea by Oil (and its 1962, 1969 and 1971 London Amendments),2 2 the 1969 Brussels International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (and its
1973 London Protocol),23 the 1969 Brussels Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage (and its 1976 and 1984 London Protocols),24
the 1976 London International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (and its
1976 and 1984 London Protocols),' the 1977 London Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration and
Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources,26 and all other provisions and
standards emanating especially from the work of the International Maritime Organization and related conventions, mostly the 1973 London International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (and
its 1978 Protocol).27 It is also hoped that the negotiating Parties would
be bound as well by the pertinent conventions resulting from the joint
work of the neighboring coastal States, or from the Regional Seas Program
of the United Nations Environmental Program applicable to their geographical region, be it the 1969 Bonn Agreement for Co-operation in
Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil, 28 the 1983 Bonn Agreement for Co-operation in Dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil
and Other Harmful Substances,29 the 1971 Copenhagen Agreement in
Measures to Deal with Pollution of the Sea by Oil,3" the 1974 Helsinki
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic
Sea Area, 3 the 1976 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution (and its 1982 Geneva Protocol concerning Specially Protected Areas) ,32 the 1976 Monaco Agreement con19. 559 U.N.T.S. 285; 516 U.N.T.S. 205; 499 U.N.T.S. 311; 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
20. 21 I.L.M. 1245.
21. 21 I.L.M. 1261.
22. 9 I.L.M. 1.
23. 9 I.L.M. 25; 13 I.L.M. 605.
24. 8 I.L.M. 453; 16 I.L.M. 617; 23 I.L.M. 150.
25. 11 I.L.M. 284; 16 I.L.M. 621.
26. 16 I.L.M. 617.
27. 12 I.L.M. 1319; 17 I.L.M. 546.
28. 9 1.L.M. 359.
29. UNEP/GC. 15/inf. 2, Nairobi, Kenya, May 1989, at 228-229.
30. Sept. 16, 1971, Norway-Sweden-Finland-Denmark, 822 U.N.T.S. 311.
31. Mar. 22, 1974, reprinted in B. Rfister & B. Simma, International Protection of the Environment (Treaties and Related Documents) 683 (1975); Resolutions 1-7 of the Baltic Sea Area, id.
32. 15 I.L.M. 285.
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cerning the Protection of the Waters of the Mediterranean Shores,33 the
1981 Abidjan Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central
Africa Region (and its Protocol concerning Co-operation in Combating
Pollution in Cases of Emergency),34 the 1983 Cartagena Convention for
the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider
Caribbean Region (and its Protocol concerning Co-operation in Combating Oil Spills),35 the 1981 Lima Convention for the Protection of the
Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific,36 the
1981 Lima Agreement on Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution
of the South-East Pacific by Hydrocarbons or other Harmful Substances
in Cases of Emergency (and its 1983 Quito Supplementary Protocol),37
the 1983 Quito Contingency Plan of Cartagena for the Combating of Oil
Pollution in the South-East Pacific in Cases of Emergency, 38 the 1978
Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the
Marine Environment from Pollution (and its Protocol concerning Regional
Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and other Harmful Substances
in Cases of Emergency)39 or the 1982 Jiddah Regional Convention for
the Conservation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Environment (and its
Protocol concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by
Oil and other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency).'
4. The negotiating, neighboring, coastal States would be equally bound
by bilaterally convened rules for the prevention of pollution by oil of
their adjoining national zones of marine jurisdiction. Mexico and the
United States, for instance, have advanced quite significantly in that
direction, not only by concluding their 1983 La Paz Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the
Border Area, 4' but also more directly in point is their 1980 Mexico City
Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharges of Hydrocarbons and other Hazardous Substances. 2
RECOGNIZING that the object and purpose of this Treaty,
as well as its Guiding Principles and Criteria, shall be
attained in a manner which shall be fully consistent with
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

UNEP/GC.15/ inf. 2, Naivori, Kenya, May 1989, at 154.
20 I.L.M. 729.
22 I.L.M. 229; 22 I.L.M. 225; 22 I.L.M. 240.
A. Szekely, Latin America and the Development of the Law of the Sea 181 (1986).
Id. at 189.
Id. at 221.
27 I.L.M. 511; 27 I.L.M. 536.
22 I.L.M. 219.
Aug. 14, 1983, United States-Mexico, T.I.A.S. No. 10827.
20 I.L.M. 696.
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both the Constitutional and other legal requirements of
which grant to the State exclusively the undertaking of all
hydrocarbon industry related activities, and with the relevant constitutional and legal requirements of
. It is recognized that such consistency is not only legally mandatory but possible.
COMMENTS TO THE SEVENTH PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH
1. As was pointed out in the introduction, the authors of this Model
felt that they would render a more useful contribution if they tackled a
situation in which the two potential negotiating parties had very different
domestic legal regimes pertaining to natural resources, and especially
hydrocarbon reserves, as is the case of Mexico and the United States.
This situation presents a larger challenge in the conclusion of a treaty
than if the contemplated countries have similar legislation on the matter.
2. Thus, each blank space in this preambular paragraph would be filled
with the name of each of the contracting parties, as appropriate (in this
case, for example, Mexico in the first blank and the United States in the
second). There is a sharp contrast between the Mexican legal regime
which grants exclusivity to the State in undertaking all hydrocarbon industry related activities, and the U.S. legal approach which allows for
private participation in that industry. Even more important are the differences between Mexican national legislation which absolutely excludes
(for very significant historical and nationalistic reasons) any form or
degree of foreign access or participation on the one hand, while on the
other hand, the United States is relatively open to both.
3. The importance of this preambular paragraph is that through its
provisions the Parties would, in explicitly recognizing such fundamental
legal divergencies, manifest not only their political will to surmount them,
but also their conviction that they can be effectively conciliated so as to
make it possible in practice to attain the objects and purposes of the Treaty
without prejudicing their legal positions at all.
4. The authors are convinced that such conciliation of legal positions
is possible without any prejudice to any of them. This was the main
challenge the drafters had to face. They could not propose treaty language
that they knew beforehand would be rejectable, for example, because of
incompatibility with Mexico's domestic hydrocarbon legislation.
5. Therefore, the authors took into careful consideration that each word
would have to respect and observe the limits imposed by Mexican law
on the matter. The main provisions of Mexican law are:
(a) that the Nation has the direct dominium over all natural resources
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of the43 continental and insular submarine shelf, including all hydrocarbons;
(b) that such dominium of the nation is inalienable and not subject to
any statute of limitations, and that in the case of any kind of hydrocarbons,
no concessions, contracts, or leases can be granted to anyone for any
44
activities that are required to be undertaken exclusively by the nation;
(c) that the Nation exclusively will undertake all hydrocarbon industry
activiites through Petr6leos Mexicanos
45 (PEMEX), a public decentralized
entity of the federal administration;
(d) that Petr6leos Mexicanos may conclude service contracts with others,
but which in no case shall contemplate payment with the natural resources
exploited;'
(e) that the activities reserved to Petr6leos Mexicanos include all phases
and stages involved in the hydrocarbon industry;47
(f) that the hydrocarbon structures and deposits reserved to activities
to be exclusively undertaken by PEMEX, in the name of the Nation,
constitute an integral part of the patrimony of PEMEX which, consequently, cannot be,
in any case, the object of sale or transaction in their
48
natural location;
(g) that the right to exploit hydrocarbons can be in no case the subject
of any transactions, and that PEMEX cannot grant royalties, percentages
or participations in the hydrocarbons or in the results of their exploitation;49 and
(h) that the Secretariat of Energy, Mining and Parastate Industry is
entrusted with legal powers to regulate the hydrocarbon industry.5 "
6. Above all, and aside from the previously indicated provisions, the
authors had to be acutely alert to the extreme sensitivity of Mexico to
any foreign ambitions regarding Mexican oil, resulting from the important
historical events that led to the 1938 Oil Expropriation undertaking by
President Lzaro Crdenas. Oil evokes the strongest nationalistic sentiments of the Mexican people and its government, as an example of their
permanent right of sovereignty over their natural resources which they
have defended for half a century at all costs.
RECOGNIZING also that nothing in this Treaty is intended
43. Const. art. 27, para. 4 (Mexico).
44. Const. art. 27, para. 6 (Mexico).
45. Const. art. 27, art. 4 of By-Law Concerning Oil (Mexico).
46. Const. art. 27, art. 6 of By-Law Concerning Oil (Mexico).
47. Const. art. 27, art. 3 of By-Law Concerning Oil (Mexico); Const. art. 27, art. 1-19 of the
By-Laws Concerning Oil (Mexico).
48. Organic Law of PEMEX, C.C.D.F., art. 3, 7 (1977), 2 Constituci6n Polftica Mexicana,
Ediciones Andrade, S.A.
49. Id.
50. Id. at the Organic Law of the Public Federal Administration.
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to be interpreted in prejudice to the positions that each of
the Parties maintain on matters relating to the law of the
sea.
COMMENTS TO THE EIGHTH AND FINAL PREAMBULAR
PARAGRAPH
1. It has become a common standard, and perhaps already a customary
practice, to include a safeguard of this nature in almost any bilateral treaty
which in any way applies at sea, involves national marine jurisdiction
zones, or relates in any possible measure to any aspect of the law of the
sea. This seems to be mostly the result of the fact that the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, even when accurately reflecting the accepted practice and opino-iurisof States, as negotiated and
agreed at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
still contains some provisions subject to varying interpretations by some
States. This has made it impossible for the Convention to be universally
embraced. There are other additional reasons why, almost invariably,
states, when engaging in conventional negotiations that involve any law
of the sea element, feel compelled to ensure the incorporation of a safeguard clause or disclaimer of this type. These other reasons are usually
in response to a variety of elements that have to do with their domestic
or foreign policy realities, with geographical, geological, oceanographic,
regional and other factors. Such a disclaimer has been incorporated between Mexico and the United States in all of their conventional bilateral
instruments relating to the sea, whether in the field of fisheries, marine
delimitation, marine environment or others.
2. A disclaimer such as the one proposed in this final preambular
paragraph of this Model is obligatory, in the case of these two neighboring
coastal States, since a Maritime Delimitation Treaty between Mexico and
the United States has yet to come into force.
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1
Purpose and Scope
1. The purpose of this Treaty is to establish mutually
agreed guiding principles and criteria, as well as the framework for specific agreements, that shall coordinate activities pertaining to deposits of transboundary submarine
hydrocarbon resources, that is to say, hydrocarbon deposits that extend across the common maritime boundary
established by the Parties.
2. The provisions of this Treaty apply to the coordination
of all activities pertaining to transboundary hydrocarbon
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627

deposits undertaken on either side of the common maritime
boundary established by the Parties and in accordance with
their respective national laws and regulations, including
but not limited to all stages of submarine scientific research,
exploration, and exploitation, as well as environmental inspection, surveillance, and safety measures.
COMMENTS
1. For the purposes of this draft, the term hydrocarbon deposit means:
A unique natural subsurface accumulation of petroleum (oil and/or gas
for example) whose limits are established by subsurface geologic factors.
2. As stated in the introduction the purpose of this Model is to serve
as the framework within which two neighboring coastal States may cooperate in future activities regarding any submarine hydrocarbon transboundary deposit. Thus, it is not specifically designed for a particular
deposit. Therefore, the Model seeks to provide precisely the principles
and criteria that will guide such cooperation in all potential cases. This
is not too different from what can already be observed in conventional
state practice, except that, in most bilateral agreements already concluded,
it is the principles and criteria themselves that are convened in too general
terms, whereas in this Model they have been codified and developed
extensively in order to provide a more precise and exhaustive legal framework.
3. Most States have been willing to include clauses in their bilateral
continental shelf treaties dealing, at least in general, with known or
potential submarine transboundary resources. Fifty-eight bilateral agreements regarding continental shelf boundary delimitation were analyzed
to determine the extent to which state practice can be derived from them.
The following results were obtained.
4. About 70 percent of the international agreements examined by the
authors do address the question of potential or known resources in the
delimitation area. Most of them refer to the former, and simply provide
very general principles that the parties should apply regarding their utilization and conservation. But it is exceedingly interesting to classify
them in six different, albeit similar, categories of provisions which can
be identified from their analysis:
(a) The most widely followed, in many instances to the letter, is the
provision included in Article 6 of the Australia-Papua New Guinea Treaty
on Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area Between the Countries, Including the Area Known as Torres Strait and Related Matters,
signed in Sidney on December 18, 1976:
Exploitation of certain seabed resources: If any single accumulation of liquid hydrocarbons or natural gas, or if any other mineral
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deposit beneath the seabed, extends across any line defining the limits
of seabed jurisdiction of the Parties, and if the part of such accumulation or deposit that is situated on one side of such a line is
recoverable in fluid, wholly or in part from the other side, the Parties
shall consult with a view to reaching agreement on the manner in
which the accumulation or deposit may be most effectively exploited
and on the equitable sharing of the benefits from such exploitation."

An almost identical clause is included in as many as twelve other
bilateral continental shelf boundary delimitation agreements, mostly for
the North Sea and the southeast Asia-southwestern Pacific regions. 2
(b) Four Persian Gulf bilateral agreements add another important element to the previous formula, since they go so far as to agree on the
principle of exploitation itself that will rule the cooperative action of the
neighbors. The principle was originally designed for the Iran-Qatar Agreement Concerning the Boundary Line Dividing the Continental Shelf 3 and
was later imitated in the Iran-United Arab Emirate, Iran-Oman, and Bahrain-Iran Agreements.'
51. Treaty on Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area Between the Countries, Including
the Area known as Torres Strait and Related Matter, Australia-Papua, New Guinea, reprinted in 8
New Directions in the Law of the Sea 215, 227 (M. Nordquist, S. Lay & K. Simmonds eds. 1980).
52. Agreement Delimiting the Continental Shelf Boundary, Mar. 10, 1965, Norway-United Kingdom, 551 U.N.T.S. 213, reprinted in I New Directions in the Law of the Sea 120 (S. Lay, R.
Churchill & M. Nordquist eds. 197,3); Agreement Dividing the Conntinental Shelf, Dec. 8, 1965,
Denmark-Norway, 551 U.N.T.S. 213, reprintedin I New Directions in the Law of the Sea 123 (S.
Lay, R. Churchill & M. Nordquist eds. 1973); Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the
Continental Shelf, Mar. 3, 1966. United Kingdom-Denmark, 592 U.N.T.S. 209; Agreement on the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, July 24, 1968, Norway-Sweden, U.N. Doc. STILEGISER.81
16, at 413; Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelves Between the Two
Countries, Oct. 27, 1969, Indonesia-Malaysia, reprinted in 1 The International Law of the Ocean
Development 424 (S. Oda ed. 1972); Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf, Nov. 25, 1971, Denmark-United Kingdom, T.S. No. 35, Cmnd. 3278 (Great Britain); Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea, Nov. 25, 1971,
Federal Republic of Germany-United Kingdom, T.S. No. 24, Cmnd. 3254 (Great Britain); Agreement
Relating to the Delimitation of a Continental Shelf Boundary in the Northern Part of the Strait of
Malacca and in the Andaman Sea, Dec. 17, 1971, Indonesia-Thailand, U.N. Doc. STILEGISER.8!
18, at 437; Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between Greenland and
Canada, Dec. 17, 1973, Denmark-Canada, 950 U.N.T.S. 147, reprintedin 4 New Directions in the
Law of the Sea 105 (R. Churchill & M. Nordquist eds. 1975); Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Boundary in the Northern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries,
Feb. 5, 1974, Japan-Republic of Korea, reprinted in 4 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 113
(R. Churchill & M. Nordquist eds. 1975); Agreement Concerning Certain Boundaries Between
Papua, New Guinea and Indonesia, Feb. 12, 1973, Australia-Indonesia, reprintedin 4 New Directions
in the Law of the Sea 100 (R. Churchill & M. Nordquist eds. 1975); Agreement Regarding the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Great Channel Between Great Nicobar Island and
Sumatra, Aug. 8, 1974, India-Indonesia, reprintedin 5 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 265
(R. Churchill, M. Nordquist & S. Lay eds. 1977).
53. Agreement Concerning the Boundary Line Dividing the Continental Shelf, Sept. 20, 1969,
Iran-Qatar, reprinted in 5 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 226 (R. Churchill, M. Nordquist
& S. Lay eds. 1977) [hereinafter Iran-Qatar Agreement].
54. Agreement Concerning the Boundary Line Dividing Parts of the Continental Shelf, Aug. 13,
1974, Iran-United Arab Emirates, reprinted in 5 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 242 (R.
Churchill, M. Nordquist & S. Lay eds. 1977) [hereinafter Iran-U.A.E. Agreement]; Agreement
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Article 2 of the Iran-Qatar Agreement reads:
If any single geological petroleum structure or petroleum field, or
any single geological structure or field of any other mineral deposit,
extends across the boundary line .... and part of such structure or
field which is situated on one side of that boundary line could be

exploited wholly or in part by directional drilling on either side of
the boundary line, then: (a) no well shall be drilled on either side of
the boundary line, so that any producing section thereof is less than
125 meters from the said boundary line, except by mutual agreement
between the two Governments, (b) both Governments shall endeavor
to reach agreement as to the manner in which the operations on both
sides of the boundary line could be co-ordinated or unitized."5
Attention must be paid both to the buffer zone established in paragraph
(a) of Article 2, as well as to the concepts of coordination and unitization.
(c) Five Caribbean or Latin American bilateral treaties, all of them
involving Colombia, are modest since they merely stress the principle of
cooperation. 6 Typical of them is the Colombia-Costa Rica Treaty on
Delimitation of Marine and Submarine Areas and Maritime Cooperation,
of which reads:
To develop the broadest cooperation between the two countries
for the protection of the renewable or non-renewable resources found
within the marine or submarine areas over which they exercise or
may in the future exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or supervision
and to use those resources for the welfare of their peoples and their
national development.5 7
(d) Two North Sea bilateral agreements, between the same parties
which had participated in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases at the
International Court of Justice, were signed two years after the Court's
Judgment which, in dealing with submarine transboundary deposits, make
an exaggerated express effort to make it quite clear that the part of a
Concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, July 25, 1974, Iran-Oman, reprinted in 5 New
Directions in the Law of the Sea 235 (R. Churchill, M. Nordquist & S. Lay eds. 1977) [hereinafter
Iran-Oman Agreement]; Agreement Concerning Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, June 17,
1971, Bahrain-Iran, reprinted in 5 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 230 (R. Churchill, M.
Nordquist & S. Lay eds. 1977) [hereinafter Bahrain-Iran Agreement].
55. Iran-Qatar Agreement, supra note 53, at art. 2.
56. See Convention on Delimitation of Marine and Submarine Areas and Maritime Co-operation,
Aug. 23, 1975, Colombia-Ecuador, reprinted in 5 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 12 (R.
Churchill, M. Nordquist & S. Lay eds. 1977); Treaty on Delimitation of Marine and Submarine
Areas and Maritime Cooperation, Mar. 17, 1977, Colombia-Costa Rica, reprintedin 8 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 93 (M. Nordquist, S. Lay & K. Simmonds eds. 1980) [hereinafter
Colombia-Costa Rica Treaty]; Agreement on the Declaration of Marine and Submarine Areas and
Maritime Cooperation, Jan. 13, 1978, Dominican Republic-Colombia, reprintedin 8 New Directions
in the Law of the Sea 78 (M. Nordquist, S. Lay & K. Simmonds eds. 1980); Maritime Limits
Agreement, Feb. 18, 1978, Colombia-Haiti, reprinted in 8 New Directions in the Law of the Sea
76 (M. Nordquist, S. Lay & K. Simmonds eds. 1980).
57. Colombia-Costa Rica Treaty, supra note 56, at art. III.
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deposit on one side of the boundary belongs precisely to the coastal State
on that side. 58 Article 2 of the agreement between Denmark and the Federal
Republic of Germany provides that if a deposit extends to the other side
of the boundary, agreement is needed for its exploitation "taking into
account the interests of both Contracting. Parties on the principles that
is entitled to the mineral resources located on its
each Contracting Party
59
continental shelf."

(e) Two Mediterranean bilateral agreements which limit themselves to
stressing the concept of consultation, were concluded in 1968 between
Italy and Yugoslavia, and in 1971 between Italy and the Tunisian Republic. Article 2 of the first instrument provides:
In case it is ascertained that natural resources of the sea bottom or
under the sea bottom extend on both sides of the demarcation line
of the continental shelf with the consequence that the resources of
the shelf belonging to one of the Contracting Parties can be in whole
or in part exploited from the part of the shelf belonging to the other
Contracting Party, the competent authorities of the Contracting Parties will themselves be in contact with one another with the intention
of reaching an understanding of the manner in which the aforesaid
resources shall be exploited previous to consultations by the holders
of any eventual concessions.'
(f) The elements contained in the previous three formulas were basically compiled and integrated in two other conventions in Europe, concluded by Italy and Spain, and by France and Spain in 1974. Article 4
of the latter instrument establishes:
1. If a deposit of natural resources is divided by the boundary
line on the continental shelves and the part of the deposit situated
on one side of the boundary line is exploitable, wholly or in part,
from installations situated on the other side of that line, the Contracting Parties shall, in consultation with the licensees, if any, seek
to reach agreement on the conditions for the exploitation of the
deposit, in order that this exploitation may be the most profitable
possible and so that each of the Parties preserves the whole of its
rights over the natural resources of its continental shelf. In particular,
this procedure shall be applied if the method of exploitation of the
58. Treaty on-the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf under the North Sea, Jan. 28, 1971,
Netherlands-Federal Republic of Germany, 10 I.L.M. 607; Treaty Relating to the Delimitation of
the Continental Shelf Under the North Sea, Jan. 28, 1971, Federal Republic of Germany-Denmark,
10 I.L.M. 603 [hereinafter Denmark-F.R.G. Treaty of 1971].
59. Denmark-F.R.G. Treaty, supra note 58, at art. 2.
60. Agreement on the Continental Shelf Boundary, Jan. 8, 1968, Italy-Yugoslavia, reprinted in
1 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 112 (S.Lay, R. Churchill & M. Nordquist eds. 1973). See
also, Agreement Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the Two Countries,
Aug. 20, 1971, Italy-Tunisia, reprintedin 5 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 247 (S.Lay, R.
Churchill & M. Nordquist eds. 1977).
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part of the deposit situated on one side of the boundary line affects
the conditions of exploitation of the other part of the deposit.
2. In the event of the natural resources of a deposit situated on
both sides of the boundary line of the continental shelf already having
been exploited, the Contracting Parties should in consultation with
the licensees, if any, seek to reach agreement on appropriate compensation. 6
In addition to the concern that this convention has for the acquired
rights of licensees, its Article 3 has an advanced clause for an agreed
regime for transboundary resources which constitutes an important precedent on the matter. It provides that the parties will exploit and equally
divide the resources of a well-defined square in the delimited area.
(g) The most advanced precedent of bilateral agreements providing for
a concrete regime for joint cooperation in the utilization of submarine
transboundary deposits are contained in seven instruments, which are also
worth classifying.
Two North Sea agreements specifically include the principle of "unitization." One of them was concluded between the United Kingdom and
Norway Relating to the Exploitation of the Frigg Field Reservoir and the
Transmission of Gas Therefrom to the United Kingdom.62 The other was
the Iceland-Norway Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland
and Jan Mayen, and stemmed directly from the recommendations of the
Conciliation Commission to which they submitted their dispute. It is
significant that both treaty and case law come together in this subject,
particularly with the Jan Mayen case, for after the Conciliation Commission's decision, the parties entered into perhaps the most important
treaty from which the most relevant experience for the law of submarine
transboundary resources can be extracted.63 This bilateral instrument was
concluded on the basis of the Commission's recommendation for the
adoption of a detailed joint development agreement, covering substantially all of the area offering any significant prospect of hydrocarbon
production, and which would take the following into account: Iceland's
dependence on imports for oil; the fact that the shelf surrounding that
country had a very low hydrocarbon potential; and the fact that the ridge
61. Convention on Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the Two States, Feb. 19, 1974,
Italy-Spain, reprinted in 5 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 261 (S. Lay, R. Churchill & M.
Nordquist eds. 1977). See also, Convention on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between
the Two States in the Bay of Biscay, June 29, 1974, France-Spain, 996 U.N.T.S. 345, reprinted in
5 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 251 (S. Lay, R. Churchill & M. Nordquist eds. 1977).
62. Agreement Relating to the Exploitation of the Frigg Field and the Transmission of Gas
Therefrom to the United Kingdom, May 10, 1976, United Kingdom, May 10, 1976, United KingdomNorway, reprinted in 5 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 398 (S. Lay, R. Churchill & M.
Nordquist eds. 1977).
63. See Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Oct. 22, 1981.
Iceland-Norway, 21 I.L.M. 1222.
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did offer possibilities. The Commission suggested even the form such a
joint cooperation agreement might take, including concession contracts
with joint venture arrangements, service contracts, production sharing
contracts, and entrepreneur contracts. This precedent derives its invaluable importance from the fact that, on the basis of the Conciliation Commission's recommendations, the two countries in fact adopted the above
mentioned agreement which established a joint venture exploitation scheme
based on the principle of "unitization."
Three other agreements, one by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia relating to
partition of the Neutral Zone, another by Sudan and Saudi Arabia Relating
to the Joint Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Sea-Bed and
Sub-Soil of the Red Sea in the Common Zone, and the remaining one
by Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning Joint Development of
the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent to the Two Countries,
establish equal rights over the resources and, as their titles indicate, "joint
exploitation."
Finally, two Persian Gulf Agreements, between Bahrain and Saudi
Arabia, and between Abu Dhabi and Qatar, expressly provide for equal
sharing in the income derived from the exploitation of the transboundary
resources in their continental shelves.
Four other conventional instruments include some other limited formulas, which are only partially comprehensive of some of the elements
of the above agreements which relate to submarine transboundary resources. The Cuba-Haiti Agreement of 1977 contemplated joint conservation, the Iran-Saudi Arabia Agreement of 1968 merely established a
buffer zone, which is similar to the four other agreements in the same
sub-region already mentioned. A sole tripartite agreement among the
German Democratic Republic, Poland, and the Soviet Union has the
peculiarity of reserving the continental shelf in the Baltic, exclusively
for nationals and firms of the Baltic States. Finally, the Abu Dhabi-Dubai
Agreement on the Offshore Boundary modifies a previously drawn line
in the continental shelf so that the Fateh Wells lie on the Dubai side,
since Abu Dhabi recognized that country's ownership of such wells.'
64. See Agreement Relating to the Joint Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Sea-Bed and
Sub-Soil of the Red Sea in the Common Zone, May 16, 1974, Sudan-Saudi Arabia, reprinted in 5
New Directions in the Law of the Sea 393 (R. Churchill, M. Nordquist & S. Lay eds. 1977),
Agreement Concerning Joint Development of the Southern Part of the Continental Shelf Adjacent
to the Two Countries, Feb. 5, 1974, Japan-Republic of Korea, reprinted in 4 New Directions in the
Law of the Sea 117 (R. Churchill & M. Nordquist eds. 1975); Continental Shelf BoundaryAgreements
in the Persian Gulf, Feb. 22, 1965, Bahrain-Saudi Arabia, reprintedin 5 New Directions in the Law
of the Sea (S. Lay, R. Churchill & M. Nordquist eds. 1977); Agreement Regarding the Delimitation
of the Maritime Boundaries Between the Two States, Oct. 27, 1977, Haiti-Cuba, reprintedin 9 New
Directions in the Law of the Sea 69 (M. Nordquist, S. Lay & K. Simmonds eds. 1980); Sovereignty
over Al-'Arabiyah and Farsi and Delimitation of Submarine Areas Between Saudi Arabia and Iran,
Oct. 24, 1968, 696 U.N.T.S. 189, reprinted in 5 New Directions in the Law of the Sea 216 (R.
Churchill, M. Nordquist & S. Lay eds. 1977), Declaration on the Continental Shelf of the Baltic
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5. In conclusion, approximately 40 coastal States who have neighbors
with opposite or adjacent continental shelves have agreed to apply a
regime of cooperation when a delimitation line separates submarine transboundary resources. These include ten western European States, four
from eastern Europe, ten from the Middle East, two African nations, five
from southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific, three from Asia, and
six from Latin America. Their arrangements justify the assertion that the
precedents they have established point toward the emergence of a State
practice, resulting from existing international conventional law, which is
progressively developing the following principles and criteria regarding
submarine transboundary hydrocarbon resources: (a) the principle of consultation and negotiation toward the conclusion of agreements for joint
cooperation; (b) the principle of adequate and effective exploitation; (c)
the principle that the coastal State may enter into joint cooperation schemes
without relinquishing its rights over the part of the transboundary deposit
on its side of the delimitation line; (d) the slowly emerging principle of
equitable sharing in the benefits derived from the exploitation of the
principle of unitization. However, this listing of principles is still too
general and insufficient, at least as compared with those others that can
be borrowed or developed from State practice regarding other transboundary resources, such as water, a task which is attempted by the
authors in Article 2 of this draft. Nonetheless, even if that above analyzed
State practice on hydrocarbon transboundary resources has not yet produced such firmly established customary legal principles, most of the
analyzed treaties and agreements offer, individually and jointly, a rich
experience from which other countries can draw in embarking either their
own delimitation processes, or in negotiations with their neighbors to
decide the fate of their transboundary submarine wealth. 65
ARTICLE 2
Guiding Principles
Activities relating to maritime transboundary hydrocarbon
deposits shall be undertaken in accordance with the respective national laws and regulations of each of the ParSea, Oct. 23, 1968, German Democratic Republic-Poland-U.S.S.R., 7 I.L.M. 1339; Offshore Boundary Agreement, Feb. 18, 1968, Abu Dhabi-Dubai, reprinted in 5 New Directions in the Law of the
Sea 214 (R. Churchill, M. Nordquist & S. Lay eds. 1977).
65. Special attention is recommended to the following research works: P. Swan, Ocean Oil and
Gas Drilling and the Law (1979); Lagoni, Oil and Gas DepositsAcross National Frontiers,73 Am.
J. Int'l L. 215 (1979); Lagoni, Interim Measures Pending MaritimeDelimitingAgreements, 78 Am.
J. of Int'l L. 345 (1984); Utton & McHugh, supra note 5 at Onorato, Apportionment of an InternationalCommon PetroleumDeposit, 17 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 85 (1968); E. Brown, Sea-Bed Energy
and Mineral Resources and the Law of the Sea (1984); Utton, InstitutionalArrangementsfor Developing North Sea Oil and Gas, 9 Va. J. Int'l. L. 66 (1968). See also Szekely, Transboundary Oil
and Gas Selected Bibliography, 26 Nat. Res. J. 833 (1986).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

ties, and also be governed by the following guiding principles
in order to ensure proper coordination of these activities
for the benefit and protection of their respective rights and
interests:
I. The duty of cooperation between the Parties to ensure
the continued attainment of the purposes and objects of
this Treaty;
H. The duty of good faith and good neighborliness of each
of the Parties in the undertaking of their respective activities, in the mutual coordination of such activities and in
the compliance with the guiding principles and criteria
established pursuant to this Treaty;
III. The duty not to take advantage of or use their respective national laws and regulations and applicable rules
of international law in such a way as would unnecessarily
impede the equitable and reasonable utilization and distribution and conservation of transboundary hydrocarbon
resources;
IV. The duty of each of the Parties to abstain from undertaking activities within its jurisdiction or control that
may cause damage to the resources or the environment of
the other Party, or that may create an unreasonable risk
in that respect;
V. The duty of the Parties to consult with each other on a
continuing basis in order to secure the coordination of activities which is the main purpose and object of this Treaty;
VI. The duty of each of the Parties to provide the other
with prompt notification of its intention to undertake any
activities relating to transboundary hydrocarbon deposits;
VII. The duty of the Parties to exchange all information,
data and publications relevant to maritime transboundary
hydrocarbon deposits and the purposes and objectives of
this Treaty. The use of proprietary information exchanged
between the Parties shall be subject to the conditions of
confidentiality established by the Party providing such information;
VIII. The duty of the Parties to cooperate with each other
in order to prevent waste of maritime transboundary hydrocarbon resources and to prevent or abate environmental
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pollution or damage stemming from activiites relating to
maritime transboundary hydrocarbon deposits; and
IX. The duty of the Parties not to undertake any unilateral
or bilateral activities contrary to their obligations under
international law, whenever a transboundary hydrocarbon
deposit extends across their common maritime boundary,
or extends into the sub-soil of the sea-bed under the jurisdiction of a third State, or in the sub-soil of the sea-bed
and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
COMMENT
1. From the Comment to Article 1, it can be observed that some of
the Guiding Principles already can be found in, and were in a way taken
from the international conventional practice of States in the field of submarine hydrocarbon transboundary resources. In addition, concepts have
been borrowed from international practice developed for other transboundary resources, especially water resources.
2. Therefore, the list of Principles in Article 2 is an attempt to codify,
and incorporate the experience developed in State practice that constitutes
the emerging international law of transboundary resources. For example,
that experience includes the U.N. General Assembly and UNEP Resolutions mentioned in the comments to the preambular paragraphs of this
Model, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,' the 1957 Buenos Aires
Inter-American Bar Association Tenth Conference Resolution on Princples of Law Governing the Use of International Rivers,67 the 1966 Helsinki
Rules of the International Law Association Fifty-Second Conference, on
the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, the 1986 Seoul Rules of
the International Law Association Sixty-Second Conference, 6" on International Groundwaters, the 1985 Ixtapa69 and 1989 Bellagio Draft Agreements Relating to the Use of Transboundary Groundwaters, 7' and the
1986 Hague Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development adopted by the Experts Group on Environmental Law
of the World Commission on the Environment and Development. 7'
66. 21 I.L.M. 1261.
67. Inter-American Bar Association, Proceedings of the Tenth Conference held at Buenos Aires,
Nov. 14-21, 1958 (2 vols.).
68. Adopted by the International Law Association at the Fifty-second Conference, held at Helsinki
in Aug. 1966. International Law Association, Report of the Committee on Uses of the Waters of
International Rivers 56 (1967).
69. Rogers & Utton, The Ixtapa Draft Agreement Relating to Use ofTransboundary Groundwaters,
25 Nat. Res. J. 715 (1985).
70. Hayton & Utton, Transboundary Groundwater: The Bellagio Draft Treaty 29 Nat. Res. J.
663 (1989).
71. Graham & Trodman, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal Principles
and Recommendations (1987) (M. Nijhoff Publishers).
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ARTICLE 3
Guiding Criteria for the Identification of
Maritime Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits
1. If any of the Parties or any person under their jurisdiction or control, while undertaking submarine scientific
research or exploration activities, or by any other means,
establishes the probable existence of any hydrocarbon deposit which it knows or has reasonable scientific evidence
to believe extends across the common maritime boundary
established by the Parties, the said Party shall promptly
notify the Commission established pursuant to Article 4 of
this Treaty and the other Party of this finding. The Commission shall then promptly declare the identified probable
hydrocarbon deposit as a probable maritime transboundary hydrocarbon deposit.
2. From the date of the declaration by the Commission
of a probable maritime transboundary hydrocarbon deposit as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article, there shall
be a moratorium on any drilling or drilling related activities
in any part of said transboundary deposit, until the Parties
have mutually agreed on a Bilateral Coordination Scheme
for its exploitation and conservation, as provided in Article
5, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of this
Treaty.
3. The notification to be given in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, shall contain the known geographical coordinates of the identified maritime transboundary
hydrocarbon deposit and all available relevant information
pertaining to its location and to other characteristics.
4. If an identified hydrocarbon deposit is wholly situated
on one side of the common maritime boundary, the Party
on the other side shall not derive from this Treaty any
rights of access to that hydrocarbon deposit, even if this
could be accomplished wholly or in part by directional
drilling from its side of the boundary, unless the Party on
whose side of the maritime boundary the deposit is situated
concludes a separate agreement to that effect with the other
Party, in accordance with its national laws and regulations,
in which case both Parties shall expressly determine which
of the guiding principles and criteria provided in this Treaty
shall apply to that separate agreement.
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5. Nothing in this Article shall prevent the Parties from
concluding agreements, which shall be regarded as Annexes
to this Treaty, to jointly undertake submarine scientific
research activities, or to coordinate exploration activities
within their respective sides of the common maritime
boundary, in conformity with their respective national laws
and regulations, in order to identify maritime transboundary geologic structures or apparent transboundary hydrocarbon deposits. If such activities identify any such structure
or apparent maritime transboundary hydrocarbon deposits, the Commission should be notified as required in paragraph I of this Article, in order that the declaration and
moratorium provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article
may be carried out.
6. This Treaty also applies to probable or confirmed
maritime transboundary hydrocarbon deposits identified
by either of the Parties prior to the entry into force of the
Treaty, and within 180 days thereafter the Parties shall
comply with the pertinent provisions of this Article. The
moratorium referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article and
the obligations provided by paragraph 3 shall be regarded
as binding on the Parties at least from the date of entry
into force of this Treaty, without prejudice to any preexisting rights and interests of the Parties pertaining to
those probable or confirmed deposits in accordance with
international law and with their respective national laws
and regulations.
COMMENT
1. As may be appreciated, starting with Article 3 the authors had their
opportunity to contribute creatively to develop concepts which they found
only in a preliminary stage in existing conventional practice. 2
2. It is hoped by the authors that paragraph 1 is a constructive elaboration on the typical basic conventional concept incorporated, for instance, in the Australia-Papua New Guinea 1976 Treaty for the Torres
Strait Area.73 The duty of notification in this paragraph is consistent with
the same duty provided in paragraph VI of Article 2 of this Model Draft.
3. The moratorium devised in detail in paragraph 2 is based on the
precedent found in the 1969 Iran-Qatar Agreement for the Persian Gulf,74
72. See Comments to article I of this Model Draft.
73. See paragraph 4(a) of Comments to article I on this Model Draft.
74. See Comment 4(b) to article I of this Model Draft.
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although it has been more fully developed in this draft and elaborated
with precision.
4. Paragraph 3 is also based on the precedent available from Article
2 of the Iran-Qatar Agreement,' although enriched with more precise
formulations.
5. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are drafted also taking advantage of the experience obtainable from many of the bilateral treaties analyzed, but to a
degree of greater specification.
6. Paragraph 6 develops the concept found in paragraph 2 of Article
4 of the France and Spain 1974 Treaty for the Bay of Biscay."
7. This Article attempts to afford an ample code of coherent criteria
that will guide the neighboring coastal States to effectively cooperate and
abide by the principles set in Article 2.
ARTICLE 4
Coordinating Mechanism
Pursuant to this Treaty, on the date of its entry into force
a Joint Permanent Coordinating Commission shall be established. The Commission shall be composed of two Commissioners. Each Party shall appoint one Commissioner to
the Commission. The main function of the Commission
shall be to serve as a bilateral coordinating mechanism for
the implementation of this Treaty. The Commission will
work on the following basis:
I. Each Commissioner shall appoint a respective Secretariat, Scientific and Technical Staff. The Parties shall endeavor to secure an adequate correspondence in the
composition of their respective Commissioner's Secretariats, Scientific and Technical Staffs.
II. Each Party shall bear the expenses for the functioning
of its respective Commissioner, Secretariat and Scientific
and Technical Staff.
III. The Commissioners shall jointly recommend to the
Parties the measures to be taken to adequately implement
this Treaty. Whenever the Parties agree on such recommendations, they shall be recorded in Minutes of the Commission to be signed by representatives of the Parties. These
minutes shall be regarded as annexes of this Treaty.
IV. All consultations, notifications and exchanges of infor75. See Iran-Qatar Agreement, supra note 53, at art. 2.
76. See Comment 4(f)(2) to article I of this Model Draft.
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mation and data between the Parties, as provided by this
Treaty, unless otherwise agreed, shall be conducted through
the Commissioners.
V. The Commissioners shall be individually or jointly, as
appropriate, responsible for supervising the implementation of the Bilateral Coordination Schemes referred to in
Article 5 of this Treaty.
VI. Each Commissioner shall coordinate with the competent authorities of the designating Party's Government
and with other interested persons under its jurisdiction and
control.
COMMENT
1. This mechanism takes very much into account the work and experience of the Mexico-U.S. International Boundary and Water Commission, as established in 1889 and developed on the basis of the 1944
Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana
Rivers and of the Rio Grande."
2. The authors felt it appropriate to take advantage of such a successful
scheme, which has been a model for many other countries.
ARTICLE 5
Bilateral Coordination Schemes
1. All activities undertaken by the Parties or by those
legally authorized by the respective Parties relating to
probable submarine transboundary hydrocarbon deposits
shall be subject to the provisions of a Bilateral Coordination
Scheme to be concluded by the Parties pursuant to this
Treaty. This provision does not apply to activities undertaken by the Parties or by those legally authorized by the
Parties on their respective sides of their common maritime
boundary, intended to lead to the identification of submarine transboundary hydrocarbon deposit sites.
2. Within sixty days after the date of entry into force of
the moratorium provided by paragraph 2 of Article 3 of
this Treaty, the Parties shall commence negotiations toward
a Bilateral Coordination Scheme. The scheme shall govern,
under the guiding principles and criteria established in this
Treaty, all activities pertaining to any identified probable
77. Tratados, Ratificados y Convenios Ejecutivos Celebrados por Mexico, Tomo IX, p. 161, 59
Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994.
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maritime transboundary hydrocarbon deposit in conformity with international law and their respective national laws
and regulations. Such negotiations shall be sponsored and
take place under the auspices of the Commission and be
conducted on the following basis:
a. Each Party shall appoint a negotiation representative,
who will also represent all interested persons under its
jurisdiction and control;
b. In the case of
(the name of
the Party with exclusive State participation), its negotiating
representative shall be appointed by
(name of the appointing Government entity). The Government
(same Party) shall be responsible to ensure that
abide by the terms of any agreed Bilateral Negotiation
Scheme.
In the Case of
(name of the
Party which allows for concessionaires), its representative
(name of the
shall be appointed by
appointing Government entity). The Government of__
(same Party) shall be responsible to ensure that its leasing
policies and regulations and its concessionaires abide by
the terms of any agreed Bilateral Negotiation Scheme;
c. All arrangements and conditions established by each
of the Parties to ensure the compliance with its obligations
under any agreed Bilateral Coordination scheme, shall be
regarded as purely internal in nature. The Commissioners
referred to in Article 4 of this treaty shall coordinate the
application of such national arrangements and conditions,
and shall make recommendations to the Parties to that end;
and
d. Any agreed Bilateral Coordination Scheme shall contain, inter alia:
I. General and specific criteria to determine the demarcation of the probable submarine transboundary hydrocarbon deposit site, as well as the geographical coordinates
of the points constituting the segment of the established
common maritime boundary that crosses it;
II. An estimate, to be annually reassessed and verified,
of the recoverable hydrocarbon reserves contained in the
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deposit as a whole, and its projected potential migratory
rate from one side of the established maritime boundary
to the other, depending on the activities to be undertaken
and the technology employed in accordance with the Bilateral Coordination Scheme;

M. General and specific criteria for determining the
percentage of the volume of the resources in the submarine
transboundary hydrocarbon deposit located on each side
of the established common maritime boundary;
IV. General and specific criteria for apportioning an equitable share of the resources in the transboundary hydrocarbon deposit, by determining the aliquot part accruing
to each of the Parties in the total volume of the resources,
depending on the percentage of that total volume that is
under the sea-bed within each side of the established common maritime boundary;
V. The definition and detailed organization of the transboundary hydrocarbon deposit development and extraction plan, and the role, rights and obligations of each of
the Parties in it;
VI. The definition and rational distribution of activities
to be separately and individually undertaken in the transboundary hydrocarbon deposit by each Party within its
respective side of the established maritime boundary, in
order to implement and carry out its obligations under the
Bilateral Coordination Scheme;
VII. The definition and planning of any joint activities
provided by the Bilateral Coordination Scheme, which shall
be conducted by the Parties. These joint activities shall be
conducted in conformity with the respective national laws
and regulations of the Parties;
VIII. The definition and planning of individual or joint
activities to be undertaken by the Parties under the most
efficient concepts of viable unitization of the deposit, as
required for its adequate utilization and protection, whenever the implementation of such concept is not precluded
by the national laws and regulations of either of the Parties;
IX. Approaches and methods for solving problems stemming from legal impediments to joint activities that are
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necessary due to the physical unity of the deposit. These
approaches are to be directed at impediments that may be
imposed by the national laws and regulations of either of
the Parties;
X. The definition and plan of seismographic or other
surveying activities to be conducted in the transboundary
hydrocarbon deposit site by each National Operator on its
side of the established maritime boundary;
XI. The definition and the plan of scientific and technical
studies concerning activities regarding the transboundary
hydrocarbon deposit;
XH. The definition and the plan of all individual and
joint supervision and inspection measures to be undertaken
by the Parties in order to implement the Bilateral Coordination Scheme;
XIH. Criteria for the preparation of technical and financial reports;
XIV. The appointment by each of the Parties of a National Operator or operators of the Bilateral Coordination
Scheme, who shall work under the general supervision of
their respective Commissioners;
XV. Criteria for exchanging information regarding the
activities of the National Operators authorized by each of
the Parties to be undertaken exclusively within each Party's
side of the established common maritime boundary;
XVI. The demarcation of the areas or sub-zones of the
transboundary hydrocarbon deposit on each side of the
established common maritime boundary, where the respective National Operators of each Party are authorized
to conduct activities under the Bilateral Coordination
Scheme;
XVH. The number, location and spacing of exploratory
drilling activities to be undertaken by each Party or its
authorized National Operator on each side of the established common maritime boundary, in the transboundary
hydrocarbon deposit site, as well as the type of technology,
methodology and equipment to be employed for that purpose;
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XVIII. The quantity, location, estimated total deposits,
and spacing of wells to be drilled by each Party or its
authorized National Operators to develop the resources on
each side of the established common maritime boundary
in the transboundary hydrocarbon deposit site, as well as
the type of technology, methodology and types of equipment
to be employed for that purpose;
XIX. A determination of the conditions for the establishment, positioning, operation and removal of all artificial
installations and structures, as well as the determination
of criteria for establishing safety zones around them; such
conditions and criteria shall be observed by each Party on
its side of their common maritime boundary;
XX. Criteria for access to artificial installations and
structures on each side of the established common maritime
boundary in the established common transboundary hydrocarbon deposit site;
XXI. General and specific criteria to jointly and individually protect the integrity of the transboundary hydrocarbon deposit;
XXII. The determination of individual or joint measures
to be undertaken by the Parties to secure the optimum
recovery of the resources, and to prevent their prejudicial
or wasteful exploitation;
XXIII. Criteria for establishing the maximum rate of
allowable daily production by each well on each side of the
established common maritime boundary to assure the most
efficient recovery of the hydrocarbon resources;
XXIV. Estimates of all individual and joint expenses involved in the implementation of the Bilateral Coordination
Scheme;
XXV. Criteria for determining the allocation between
the Parties, when applicable, of both costs and revenues;
XXVI. Criteria for sharing the total production in proportion to the amount of recoverable hydrocarbon reserves
within each side of the established common maritime
boundary in the transboundary hydrocarbon deposit site;
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XXVII. Criteria for sharing royalties, profits and fees,
when applicable; and
XXVHI. The establishment of general and specific agreed
standards to conserve and protect the transboundary hydrocarbon deposit, to prevent and abate damage to the
surrounding environment or natural resources and to respond to cases of emergency in accordance with Article 6
and under previously defined emergency plan;
3. The Parties may conclude their Bilateral Coordination Schemes in progressive stages, as it may be deemed
feasible or necessary, and may supplement these Schemes
with Appendices in order to provide for agreements on
specialized or supervening matters, in order to cover subjects contained in paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. The Bilateral Coordination Schemes and their Appendices shall be regarded as Annexes to this Treaty.

COMMENT
1. It is to be understood that any reference in this Article to National
Operators involves those physical or juridical persons which, in accordance with the applicable law of each Party, are authorized to undertake
activities pertaining to a hydrocarbon deposit within the respective jurisdictions of the parties whether in the capacity as a concessionaire or, as
in the case of Mexico, an exclusive state entity.
2. The idea of Bilateral Coordination Schemes was directly taken from
the 1983 La Paz Agreement for the Protection and Improvement of the
Environment in the Border Area between Mexico and the United States
which has already yielded significant Annexes."8
3. The technical elements to be contained in the schemes, as described
in paragraph 2(d), were taken more from State practice regarding transboundary water resources, as evidenced in the Ixtapa and Bellagio Drafts,
than from the relatively scarce elements obtainable from the 58 bilateral
treaties analyzed and which pertained to submarine hydrocarbons.79
4. Great efforts were made by the authors to preserve, to the largest
degree possible, the concept of "unitization" (see paragraph 2(d) VIII
and IX), in a manner consistent with the national laws and regulations
of the Parties, especially Mexico. The proposals of the authors in this
78. Tratados, Ratificados y Convenios Ejectivos por Mexico, Vol. XXV, p. 125, T.I.A.S. No.
10827.
79. See Treaties and Agreements, supra notes 53-61.
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regard will require further attention by those experts who will be involved
in the final review of this Model Draft.
ARTICLE 6
Environmental Incidents
1. If either Party to a Bilateral Coordinating Scheme
has knowledge of or reason to believe that there is an imminent environmental danger as a result of the activities
of that Bilateral Coordinating Scheme, that party shall
immediately notify the Commission.
2. Upon receiving notification of an imminent environmental danger from any Party, the Commission shall immediately order an inspection of the reported site.
3. If the Commission determines that an imminent environmental danger is present at the reported site, the
Commission shall immediately order the suspension of all
directly or indirectly related activities.
4. The Commission shall determine the measures necessary to rectify the imminent environmental danger at the
site of that Bilateral Coordinating Scheme, and shall direct
and supervise those measures to be carried out.
5. The Commission shall ascertain the expenses involved
in rectifying imminent danger at that Bilateral Coordinating Scheme. Each Party shall recompense the Commission
for their prorated cost for the rectification of the imminent
danger at that Bilateral Coordinating Scheme site.
6. The Commission shall base its determinations on the
established environmental standards and guidelines for that
Bilateral Coordinating Scheme, as set forth in Article V,
2(d), xxvm of this Treaty.
7. For the purposes of this Treaty an "imminent environmental danger" means any occurrence in the performance of a Bilateral Coordinating Scheme that causes or
may cause substantial damage to the surrounding environment of that Bilateral Coordinating Scheme.
COMMENTS
1. A separate article for this concern seems to be necessary to avoid
compounding the problems that occur when there is an environmental
incident. This article attempts to provide the procedural detail necessary
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to facilitate an abatement of an environmental incident without the delay
of trying to determine what is to be done and who is responsible for
resolving the myriad problems that accompany an environmental incident.
2. If a separate article for environmental incidents is not used, then
the current language in Article V, 2d, XXVIII seems to be sufficiently
broad to address most environmental incidents yet, as mentioned before,
this section may not contain enough detail to escape the procedural ordeals
that will inevitably accompany such occurrences.
3. If a separate article addressing environmental incidents is not used,
then the text of this proposed environmental incident article could be
paraphrased to provide additional guidance for the Parties to the Treaty
as a comment to Article V, 2d, XXVIII.
ARTICLE 7
Accommodation of Differences
1. The Joint Permanent Coordinating Commission shall
expend its best efforts to resolve differences within the
Commission, with respect to the facts and circumstances
of a situation within the purview of this Agreement. Failure
to resolve such differences within six (6) months at the
technical level of the Commission shall result in the submission of the difference or differences, together with the
entire record, to the Parties for resolution by consultation.
2. If after good faith consultations during a period of
twelve (12) months the Parties are unable to reach an accommodation of a difference or differences between them
concerning the facts and circumstances of a situation within
the purview of this Treaty, or with respect to which the
Commission has been unable to reach agreement:
a. any Party is entitled to invoke this Article to the effect
that a Committee of Inquiry be appointed and charged
with the full and impartial study for the purpose of verification of the facts of the situation;
b. the Parties shall appoint and instruct the members
of the Committee and defray its expenses equally, unless
otherwise agreed; and
c. in the event the Parties fail to agree upon the implementation of this Paragraph within six (6) months from
the date of its formal invocation, the__
at the request of any Party shall, after consultation with
each Party, appoint the Committee, instruct it and apportion its expenses, as may be required to render the Committee operational.
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3. A Committee of Inquiry appointed under this Article
shall render a report to the Parties within the terms of its
instructions and on the basis of independent and detailed
examination of the data and information made available
to it by the Parties and the Commission, and may request
such additional data and information as the Committee of
Inquiry deems significant for its deliberation and findings.
4. On the basis of the report of a Committee of Inquiry,
the Parties undertake promptly to enter into consultations
for the purpose of reaching an agreed accommodation of
the difference or differences.
5. The Commission shall expend its best efforts to resolve differences within the Commission with respect to the
interpretation of this Treaty, of any Bilateral Coordination
Scheme, or of any other relevant document or decision.
Failure to resolve such differences within six (6) months by
the Commission shall result in the submission of such difference or differences together with the record of deliberations, to the Parties for resolution by consultation.
6. Should the Parties, after six (6) months of consultations, fail to agree upon a questioned interpretation submitted to them by the Commission, pursuant to Paragraph
5, or that has otherwise arisen, including with respect to
the validity or interpretation of any binding decision by
the Commission, the provisions of Article 8 of this Treaty
shall apply.
COMMENT
1. Disagreements, which in the normal course of deliberations are
bound to occur when a joint commission is entrusted with meaningful
tasks, are of two kinds: questions of fact-about conditions in the field
or the effectiveness of implementation measures, for example, and questions of law-interpretation of a clause in the Treaty, or a provision in a
Bilateral Coordination Scheme, for example. It is important that all such
disagreements first be given careful consideration by the Commission
itself, possibly under a separate agenda item of a subsequent meeting
devoted to differences that have arisen. The first four paragraphs of the
Article concern the procedures where there is lack of agreement on the
facts, or when they are not clear or fully developed. Paragraphs 5 and 6
of the Article concern lack of agreement with respect to interpretation of
a document.
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2. Maxwell Cohen, former Chairman of the International Joint Commission, U.S.-Canada, suggested five basic rules for avoiding conflict
between the two countries. They include "Do not prolong by unilateral
rhetoric any disagreement over basic facts. Set up joint fact finding instruments as early as possible to obtain agreement on disputed facts." 8
3. Commissioner Herrera, then Mexican Commissioner, U.S.-Mexico
International Boundary and Water Commission, has aptly said: "The first
phase of the solution of a controversy is that of defining the problem,
the more clearly the better. Sometimes incomplete knowledge of a problem leads to an equally incomplete response. . .. "" Before disagreements arise in the field or within the Commission on the meaning of the
data, the needed responses to the situation, or the interpretation of the
Agreement "harden" into formal disputes, there is a need for "internal"
discussion at the technical and commission levels. Phased machinery for
thorough internal discussion is institutionalized in this Article. Such prior
efforts at accommodation of differences have long been regarded as highly
desirable, because of the frequently vital need to continue or modify a
project or program, or to take urgent action.8 2
4. The staging of discussions through several levels may make resolution of the disagreement possible by the operating people having full,
technical understanding of the matter. These discussions may take advantage of special studies, data analysis, position papers and comparisons
of proposed alternatives. The question would be referred to the governments only if the Commission should be unable to reach an agreed accommodation. In critical cases, the Commission is certainly free to refer
the difference to the governments (and possibly with a recommendation
that a Committee of Inquiry be appointed) earlier than the six month
maximum period set forth in the Article, should it become obvious that
an internal agreement is out of the question (paragraph 1).
5. After such a referral to the governments, the agreement would
require the governments, to enter into consultations; at this stage the matter
is not yet regarded formally as a dispute. If in the end, the consultations
are not successful, the creation of a Committee of Inquiry can be precipitated at the request of either Government (paragraphs 2, 3 and 4).
6. The experienced specialists in the field are unanimous that, where
disagreements arise, recourse must first be sought in consultations among
the knowledgeable professionals.
80. See Carroll, Water Resources Management as an Issue in Environmental Policy, 26 Nat. Res.
J. 207, 218 (1986), quoting M. Cohen, The Patterns of Settlement-Canada, the United States and
the International Joint Commission (1976).
81. Herrera, The United States-Mexican InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, Am.
Society of Int'l L., Proceedings of the 68th 1974 Annual Meeting 226 (1975).
82. See Management of International Water Resources: Institutional and Legal Aspects, at 144173, U.N. Pub. Sales No. E.75.II.A.2., and cites therein.
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7. The Article's second paragraph empowers the government of any
party to demand a Committee of Inquiry after 12 months of unsuccessful
consultations. Nevertheless, where the situation is urgent, the governments collectively are free to agree to appoint such a Committee at any
time.
8. As with the fact-verification aspect (paragraphs 1-4 of the Article),
a separate opportunity and a reasonable time are provided when lack of
agreement relates to any difference over legal interpretation. When an
agreement is not reached within 6 months, the Commission is obliged to
place the matter in the hands of the governments (paragraph 5). To be
sure, if the Committee should conclude that lack of a decision on a
question is causing intolerable delays on one or more important projects
or programs, and that resolution by the Committee is clearly out of the
question, the Agreement does not preclude elevation to the governmental
level before the expiration of the six-month period.
9. Once the Commission has passed such questions "upstairs," the
governments are to enter into consultations for the purpose of seeking an
accommodation. Other issues of interpretation or validity may well arise
between the Parties, which did not come up through the Committee. In
these cases too, the Governments should seek resolution first by direct
consultations. Again a six-month "deadline" is set forth, after whichabsent agreement to prolong the consultations-the Parties have agreed
to treat the matter under the Resolution of Disputes Article (paragraph

6).
10. The relatively "tight" scheduling of these periods of deliberation
and consultation proceeds from the assumption that transboundary problems require, as often as not, timely action. Unaccommodated differences
typically mean inability to move forward with respect to a serious, deteriorating situation.
ARTICLE 8
Resolution of Disputes
1. If the consultations called for under Article 7 do not
achieve an agreed accommodation, the Parties shall promptly
enter into formal, direct negotiations for the purpose of
resolving the disagreement.
2. Should the Parties not achieve agreement after six (6)
months of direct negotiations, they shall refer the matter
to mediation, conciliation, arbitration, the International
Court of Justice or any other means of peaceful settlement,
absent a previously agreed, applicable means of dispute
settlement binding upon the Parties.
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3. In resolving differences and questions affecting the
implementation of this Agreement and decisions taken
thereunder, the Parties undertake to avoid delay and to
facilitate the process of resolution as between themselves
and, as appropriate, before any mediator, conciliator, tribunal or other settlement forum, taking into account the
importance of timely resolution with respect to critical
transboundary situations.
COMMENT
1. Experienced diplomats and natural resources specialists alike know
quite well that, even institutionalized "best efforts" to contain to disagreement and to avoid substantial delay, may fail. Given the Parties'
collective conclusion that the importance of transboundary problems demands focused and sustained response, provisions must be made in the
Treaty for the certain and accelerated settlement of intractable differences,
if and when necessary. Once the accommodation echelons have been
exhausted, formal negotiations should immediately take place. Should
negotiations fail, prompt resort to apt third-party forums must be in place.
This Article articulates the minimum commitment to dispute settlement
procedures deemed appropriate in this field. But should the Parties be
willing to accept, in the Treaty, binding arbitration, or adjudication by
an existing or especially established tribunal, resolution of disputes could
be attained with more dispatch. Short of such binding judgment, the
Parties might well consider an "automatic" provision at least for bringing
mediation or conciliation into play, the results of which after all are not
binding on the Parties. Even weaker would be this kind of "assistance"
clause: "In the event that the Parties after twelve (12) months of negotiations, or attempted negotiations, fail to choose a means of peaceful
settlement by agreement, any Party may notify the -, who (which)
is hereby empowered and requested to act as mediator [a conciliation
commission] for the purpose of assisting in the attainment of agreement
between (among) the Parties in selecting their means of peaceful settlement. "83
2. As provided in this Article, if all efforts at accommodation fail, the
traditionalsteps must be resorted to:
After "referral to the Parties" of any difference that has not been
resolved by the institutional machinery set up by the system states ....
the usual next step is direct negotiation between the Parties at the
political level. The project or programs at issue may be of such
importance that even at this stage it may be prudent for the system
83. For a full range of possible institutional arrangements, see id.
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that States arrange some or all operations to continue, pending final
resolution of the matter. Failing settlement by high-level negotiation,
the Parties are, of course, free to take the dispute to the International
Court of Justice. The International Court of Justice may in appropriate
circumstances indicate provisional measures, which could serve the
Parties' interests in avoiding delay or disruption of critical activities,
or preclude irreversible harm. The Parties are also free to refer the
matter for adjudication to any appropriate tribunal. The fundamental
requirement, in accordance with the Charter and the rules of contemporary international law, is settlement by peaceful means. In
addition to resolution by means of negotiation, inquiry and adjudication, the parties may choose, among other peaceful means, conciliation, arbitration, or the assistance of regional agencies or
arrangements."
ARTICLE 9

Ratification and Entry into Force
This Treaty is subject to ratification in accordance with the
respective constitutional procedures of each of the Parties,
and it shall come into force on the date of the exchange of
instruments and ratification.
ARTICLE 10

Amendment
This Treaty may be amended by agreement of the Parties,

subject to the provisions of Article 9.
ARTICLE 11
Denunciation and Termination

Any Party to this Treaty may terminate it by giving written
notification, through diplomatic channels, one year in advance of the date of termination. Unless otherwise agreed

by the Parties, after the termination of this Treaty, all
Bilateral Coordination Schemes in force shall be carried

out to their completion.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned representatives
being duly authorized have signed this Treaty.
84. See International Law Commission, Third Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses
of International Water Courses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/348, at 157-36. The language of both articles
7 and 8 are taken from that in the Bellagio Draft, supra note 2.
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DONE in___
on the
- day of the month of__
of 19
, in two originals in the
and
languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF

